

# ROBUSTNESS OF MATCHING: BACKUP NODES PROBLEM

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## Robustness of matching (Informal)

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## Robustness of matching (Informal)

- ▶ Given a bipartite graph, consider the situation where **some nodes arrive/leave**,
- ▶ Want to **preserve a certain property** of matching, e.g., perfectness,
- ▶ A matching is “robust” if it can be **recovered with the minimum changes** after the arrivals/departures of nodes.

# Problem

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## BACKUP NODES PROBLEM (BN)

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**Input:** A bipartite graph  $G = (A \cup B, E)$  where  $|A| < |B|$  and there exists an  $A$ -perfect matching in  $G$ .

**Output:** A subset  $S \subseteq B$  which maximizes the number of elements in  $A$  that have neighbors in  $S$  while maintaining an  $A$ -perfect matching between  $A$  and  $B \setminus S$ .

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## Motivation: project assignment

- ▶ matching between students and projects,
- ▶ possible situation: a matched project becomes unavailable after the matching result is published,
- ▶ we would like to find a “backup” unmatched project for the corresponding student without interfering other students.

## Example




Figure: An instance of BN with 3 students and 5 projects.



## Example




Figure: A feasible solution.

## Example




Figure: An optimal solution.

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## Main results

	<b>General</b>	<b>Degree-constrained</b>
<b>Algorithm</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ <math>1 - 1/e</math> approximation, via submodular maximization over a matroid constraint</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ Polynomial-time (exact) solvable, when <math>G</math> is <math>(d, 2)</math>-regular, <math>d \geq 3</math>.</li></ul>
<b>Complexity</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ NP-hard to approximate within <math>1 - 1/e + \varepsilon</math></li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ NP-hard to approximate within <math>293/297</math>, when <math>\Delta(G) = 4</math></li></ul>

## General BN

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & |N(S)| \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \exists \text{ perfect matching between } A \text{ and } B \setminus S \\ & \emptyset \subseteq S \subseteq B \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ Maximizing coverage function, over dual matroid of the matching matroid,
- ▶  $1 - 1/e$  approximation.

# Degree-constrained BN

Two easy cases

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
2.  $\deg(a) \geq d_A, \deg(b) \leq d_B$ : take any feasible  $S$ , we have

$$|N(S)| \geq \left(1 - \frac{d_B}{d_A}\right) |A|.$$




## $(d, 2)$ -regular BN

**Idea:** compute maximum matching in an auxiliary graph.




(a) The original graph  $G = (A \cup B, E)$




(b) The auxiliary graph  $G' = (A, E')$

## $(d, 2)$ -regular BN

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(a) The original graph  $G = (A \cup B, E)$



(b) The auxiliary graph  $G' = (A, E')$

**Algorithm:** max matching  $M$  of  $G' \xrightarrow{\text{correspondence}} S \subseteq B \xrightarrow{\text{augmentation}} \text{optimal solution.}$

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## Open questions

Are there any other special cases of BN, which are solvable/approximable?

For example,

1. the first unsolved case:  $\deg(b) = 3, \forall b \in B$ ,
2. other bounded degree constraints,
3. bounded VC-dimension.

## References

- ▶ [ABKN09] On revenue maximization in second-price ad auctions. In Amos Fiat and Peter Sanders, editors, Algorithms - ESA 2009, pages 155–166, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
- ▶ [Fei98] A threshold of  $\ln n$  for approximating set cover. Journal of the ACM, 45(4):634–652, 1998.
- ▶ [PSVW25] Second price matching with complete allocation and degree constraints. Preprint, 2025.
- ▶ [Wei24] Robust recoverable matching problems. Master thesis, 2024.

**Thank you for listening!** 😊

## Tightness of $(1 - 1/e)$ -approximation for BN

Gap-preserving reduction from  $\text{MAX } k\text{-COVER}$ , which has no better approximation than  $1 - 1/e$  assuming  $P \neq NP$  [Fei98].


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Step 1: Basic reduction for NP-hardness [Wei24].


Step 2: Amplifying the gap.

# NP-hardness





# NP-hardness



## Second price auctions with binary bids

A related problem called (OFFLINE) SECOND-PRICE MATCHING is studied by Azar, Birnbaum, Karlin, and Nguyen in 2009.

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### SECOND-PRICE MATCHING (2PM)

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**Input:** A bipartite graph  $G = (A \cup B, E)$ .

**Output:** A matching  $M$  with the maximum size such that all matched nodes in  $A$  has an unmatched neighbor in  $B$ .

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- ▶  $A$ : goods,
- ▶  $B$ : bidders,
- ▶ Only 0 or 1 bids,
- ▶ Maximize the second-price auction profit.